INTRODUCTION
The transformation of Japan from an authoritarian imperialist to a democratic pacifist in world affairs is one of the most remarkable political transitions of the last century. Until the middle of the nineteenth century Japanese society was utterly feudal, agricultural and decentralized. Although a military shogun exercised a certain degree of direct control over a host of vassals and an emperor was at least a nominal supreme ruler, most Japanese had little exposure to the world outside the land they rented and farmed. For such a closed, traditional society to radically transform itself into the modernized, industrial war machine which burst into Asia at the start of the twentieth century was a stunning accomplishment. Political and social upheaval underpinned this modernization at every turn and for a time produced stirrings of democracy in the wider current of authoritarianism.

Although it is tempting to explain the Japanese experience with democracy prior to 1945 through a simple lens of modernization theory or other factors internal to Japanese society, those explanations fall short. Japan’s feudal system was quite stable prior to the 1850s, when Western gunboat diplomacy finally forced the country to open its borders to foreign trade. It was only in response to the overwhelming threat that the West’s modern arms and organization posed to the nation’s integrity that Japanese elites instigated what Barrington Moore Jr. appropriately termed a “revolution from above.” Without an external impetus for change, and an external environment from which to draw new ideas and technology, Japan was unlikely to have experienced anything remotely close to the modernization and social unrest it went through in the seventy years prior to the start of what Japanese call the Fifteen-Year War (WWII). Moreover, the country certainly would not have democratized in the wake of its devastating defeat in that war without the all-important presence of U.S. occupation forces and the total restructuring of Japanese society they crafted. In this paper I argue that Japan’s relationship with its external environment drove each of the country’s key democratic transitions: the Meiji Restoration of 1868-1912, the development of “Taisho Democracy” in the interwar years, the lapse into authoritarianism in the 1930s and the post-war democratic consolidation.
THE TRANSITION FROM FEUDALISM

Japan’s transition from feudalism can be broadly understood through a constructivist, ideational diffusion model along the lines proposed by Weyland, wherein domestic actors import external institutional structures and social norms they find appealing. These foreign structures, however, are sometimes misunderstood by the importers or not well-suited for superimposition over their society. Frequently, there are unintended knock-on effects with negative outcomes. Although Weyland focuses on the Latin American experience of importing democratic institutions explicitly, the core point of his analysis rings true for the Japanese experiment in the latter half of the nineteenth century as well: foreign institutional structures did not work as intended because domestic prerequisites were absent. Japanese elites sought to import the elements of Western primacy without upsetting Japan’s internal power structure but did not pick and choose among them. As a consequence, over time they not only imported industrialization and armament but notions of liberalism and democracy. These notions were only planted in the nineteenth century, however; it took decades for the social foundations, such as political liberties and the moderation of conflict, to develop organically. Throughout this early modern period (1868-1912) Japan experienced a slow, steady erosion of the old order caused by constant self-exposure to Western ideas.

Japanese elites in the 1850s and 60s struggled to decide whether or not to import western technology and models of military organization to counter the existential threat posed by the imperial powers. An inter-elite struggle over this issue pitted a coalition of feudal lords against the shogun, the last ruler of the Tokugawa regime which had been in power continuously since it unified the country in 1600. The central regime opposed building a national military. Arming the peasants would allow them be used by fiefs to challenge the government’s authority, and the peasants themselves could rebel as well. Both outcomes were expected to severely destabilize the feudal structure. The opposition, while keenly aware of the possibility of peasant revolts, felt that it was a necessary risk given that the alternative to modernization was to succumb to western dominance. In 1868, after a civil war and under the pretense of restoring power to the imperial throne and its occupant, the emperor Meiji, the modernizers defeated the ancienne regime, marking the start of what came to be known as the Meiji Restoration. The fiefs they did not defeat directly they bought out, in essence striking the kind of pacts one would expect to see in
an O’Donnell-Schmitter-style transition from authoritarian rule. As it consolidated and gained bargaining leverage, the new regime gradually renegotiated these pacts with the last representatives of the old order, who ceased to have an effect on politics after a final spasm in the Satsuma Rebellion of 1877.

The new regime immediately initiated a modernization campaign, seeking to secure Japan’s place as a sovereign state in the international order, while preserving as much of the old feudal structure as possible. The elites’ modernization program had unintended consequences, however. Economic development was imported wholesale and imposed on society—the overwhelmingly rural population began to move into the cities to labor in industry and the old, static social order came under stress. Imported economic reforms brought with them the same social stresses western countries faced when they underwent their own industrializations. The concentration of people in the cities redefined how social classes interacted with each other and a public sphere independent of the state began to develop, containing new social groupings with their own political preferences. Japanese oligarchs inadvertently fed this growth by importing liberal social and legal norms, assuming them to be a core part of the Western recipe for success. All barriers to associational life were removed and, in a radical change, the hereditary status system was abolished and all Japanese became equal before the law. Commercial societies, educational academies, and common interest groups cropped up and began to give at least the well-to-do strata of society a social identity which was no longer tied up in the old feudal structures. Newspapers, which had never developed under the Tokugawa regime, exploded, and by 1889 there were 647 in print, 164 of which covered current events, including, critically, politics. Debating societies sprang up, the most prominent of which, the Meirokusha (Sixth Year of Meiji Society), counted among its members civil servants as well as members of the growing urban civil society and published a periodical widely read by the intelligentsia. A key result of the elite’s newfound interest in foreign ideas was an influx of the classic liberal texts of the enlightenment. The works of Mill, Locke, Spencer, Bentham and Rousseau were translated and began to circulate widely among both wealthy rural circles and the urban elite, giving rise to the Freedom and Popular Rights movement, which in 1880 gathered a quarter-million signatures demanding the creation of a national assembly.

Japanese elites had difficulty separating out western industrialization from the liberal norms with which it tended to come packaged. Where they saw the physical means needed to
challenge western preeminence, growing business interests saw parliamentary political processes which could allow their voices to be heard in ruling circles, and a burgeoning labor movement saw the possibility of unionization as a counterweight to the squalid conditions in factories and cities. The Meiji constitution, crafted by imperial advisers and enacted by the Emperor in 1889 as a “gift to the people,” was a response to this growing pressure, despite the concept of a state organized by a written constitution being itself a Western concept. The constitution gave in to bourgeois demands for representation in government by creating the Diet (parliament) in which political outsiders could gain seats and be heard, while still reserving the bulk of decision making authority for the Emperor and his cabinet. Moreover, the Diet was divided into two chambers, only one of which was filled via elections (by a small subset of wealthy males). The other was the equivalent of England’s House of Lords, its seats filled by feudal-era elites with hereditary status. This political arrangement nonetheless allowed for the formation of the first opposition party, the Liberals, around the turn of the century, which promptly began passing bills in the lower chamber to remove all remaining restrictions on freedom of association and assembly. The efforts went nowhere, however: the upper chamber could see the serious challenges to aristocratic power those measures would posses if allowed to snowball and exercised a de facto veto over further political reform through legislation.

These reforms and others, which can be seen as incremental steps in the process of democratization, were able to take root in Japanese society for a variety of reasons. First, notions such as parliaments, and freedoms of association and assembly offered both prescriptive concreteness and plausibility; newly minted Japanese liberals traveled to the West and saw that the ideas were more than just theory, they could work in practice, and all that was required was a clear-cut set of rules. Second, ordinary Japanese were increasingly literate, and the advent of newspapers offered a means for rapidly transmitting new ideas across society. Finally, the basic content of these reforms was universalist—ideas such as individual liberty made no pretense of being solely for Western peoples.

From 1889 to the end of the Meiji era in 1912, Japan could reasonably fit into Hale’s conceptualization of a “hybrid regime,” one which is neither fully authoritarian nor democratic, but is relatively stable. While a parliament with an active opposition existed, important decisions were still made at the executive and cabinet levels. Moreover, participation in the democratic process was reserved for just a small subset of the population, only a few hundred
thousand citizens out of tens of millions. To the extent that there was real political competition, it was confined to infighting among elites and was not sufficient to warrant classifying Japan as truly democratic; however, given the open presence of liberal ideas in the public discourse of the time, it would also be inaccurate to describe the regime as purely authoritarian. It was a hybrid system and a relatively long-lived one at that.

TAISHO DEMOCRACY AND ITS REVERSAL

The period 1918-31, known as the Taisho Democracy, marked Japan’s most robust democratic experiment prior to the post-war Occupation. Industrialization had spawned a growing labor movement which pressed its demands for rights and reform through the Diet, and a growing population, itself a byproduct of modernization, required immense resources to sustain. As a country with very little arable land, minerals, and other raw materials, Japan increasingly had to look beyond its borders for critical resources and began to come into conflict with its better-endowed neighbors. Wars against China (1894-5) and Russia (1904-5), coupled with the annexation of Korea (1910) placed tremendous demands on industrial production and imposed harsh conditions on the working class, but also began to change the character of the Japanese state itself. By necessity the state had to become more authoritarian in its organization, and this militarism spilt out into the domestic arena. Organized labor posed a threat to the state’s war making capacity, particularly when its strikes and protests disrupted production, so as events like the massive Rice Riots of 1918 became increasingly common in the 1920s, the government began to crack down and impose ever stricter controls on society.

Mark Pietrzyk, summarizing Otto Hintze, presents an applicable model for understanding this period of Japanese democratization. The model explains the process of democratization as a struggle between authoritarian and associational principles of organization, where the former governs the military realm and the latter civil society relationships. “An executive authority and a supporting military-security bureaucracy are created by society for purposes of successful war-making. The executive authority must of necessity employ hierarchical and coercive methods in order to mobilize and lead for war…,” writes Pietrzk. “At the same time, members of society may have relations with each other with minimal intervention by the state.” According to Pietrzk, a country can only move towards democracy if the associational principle of organization is predominant in its social relations. Internal conditions, such as the presence and
credibility of democratic ideas, the intensity of national unity, level of economic development, the presence of an independent bourgeoisie, a large middle class, or previous experience with democracy have all been shown to strengthen associational ties and pave the way for democratization. Pietrzyk argues, however, that the critical permissive condition is an external one: a country can only democratize if it is at peace with its neighbors. The extent to which the authoritarian principle is strengthened vis-a-vis the associational is directly correlated with the level of demands placed on the state to defend the integrity of the country. The more frequently the state is at war, the more likely it is to become centralized, militarized and coercive in its character.

This model fits Taisho Japan well. During the Meiji Restoration and the early part of the twentieth century Japan had remained relatively at peace with its neighbors (with the exception of the conflicts noted above). As a consequence, domestic forces unleashed by modernization and the diffusion of liberal western ideas were given room to take root and began pushing the government to democratize. Over time, however, the pendulum began to swing the other direction.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE STATE

The origins of the Japanese state as it exists today can be traced back to the late Meiji era, the end of the nineteenth century, and are best understood through the lens of Porter’s *War and the Rise of the Nation-State*. Japan’s modernization can be seen as an induced response to the threat of western power, and the organization of the modern state was a parallel development. According to Porter, we should expect to see countries go through roughly three phases in response to the threat of war. First, a kind of “proto-nationalism” takes hold, causing previously disparate groups within the nation to begin to see themselves as part of a larger, unified polity. They begin to form a distinct national identity to contrast themselves with their potential enemies. The state begins to take on a modern form in response to demands for the institutions and bureaucracy required to wage war on a large scale. Second, military service (required or voluntary) integrates geographically dispersed members of society and further reinforces nationalist sentiment. In many cases there is a call to serve a higher purpose, such as the French Revolution’s cry for *Liberté, égalité, fraternité*. In Porter’s final phase, nationalism boils over into aggression and the phenomenon of Total War takes hold. This model goes a
long way towards explaining the development of the heavily centralized Japanese government which eventually planted the seeds of its own demise in the 1930s.

Prior to the Meiji Restoration, the Tokugawa regime was remarkably stable and ran Japan by devolving most responsibilities to the feudal lords under its influence. With virtually no contact with the outside world, there was no need to create the level of government bureaucracy required to field a modern army. Once it became evident that without thorough modernization the country would soon be overrun by the West, the elites who came to power in 1868 embarked on the task of creating a state capable of meeting the challenge. Throughout the Meiji period the new state solidified, tying the once disparate fiefs together into a Japan with a single national identity in opposition to that of the West. For a time, this emerging state was able to both gather authority in the central government even as it let some of it go into the hands of parliament, especially in the Taisho era. As the organizational pressure of waging Total War abroad grew, however, the state came to dominate both the economy and civil society and a steady erosion of democracy took place up through the 1945 surrender.

Smith provides one framework for understanding the driver of this Japanese expansionism when he describes the economic order that emerged during the 1930s as neomercantalist. The giant industrial and financial conglomerates (zaibatsu) which evolved as Japan industrialized became increasingly interwoven with the state and relied on it to open up foreign markets. The impressive economic performance of this arrangement provided a way for the conservative ruling elite to claim political legitimacy, even as it defended “what appeared to be an increasingly autarchic domestic economy.” Domestic liberals, while they gained a measure of decision making power via the parliament throughout the Taisho era were too weakly organized to effectively shape public opinion or balance against the overwhelming influence of the state and military in domestic politics. Despite their inability to pull the country back from the warpath, however, the liberals were hardly a fringe voice and openly criticized the conservative ruling establishment. Smith notes that as late as 1936, one party received a plurality of the vote campaigning on the slogan, “Will it be parliamentary democracy or fascism?”

THE INITIAL PHASE OF OCCUPATION
With its defeat and unconditional surrender in the fall of 1945, Japan offered itself up to the mercy of its American occupiers. What followed was one of the most audacious attempts at
societal transformation ever made by a victor in war. The American Occupation forces under General Douglas MacArthur were explicit in their goal: pacify Japan so that it would never again embark on a war of conquest and accomplish that goal through reform and democratization.¹⁹ The American initiatives in the early phase of the Occupation can be seen as direct intellectual descendants of Wilsonianism coupled with New Deal era pragmatism. At the core of Wilsonian theory is the proposition that the most legitimate governments in the eyes of both domestic and international audiences are those which derive their authority from the consent of the governed. An international order comprised of such democratic states and supported by a liberal economic regime, collective security, and mutual respect for the self-determination of peoples will be inherently peaceful. In such an order, any state which violates the sovereignty of another necessarily commits an illegitimate, economically damaging, and militarily foolish act.²⁰ Reformers in the occupation believed that if they could bring Japan into the democratic club it would not only make the region more secure but would be a noble thing unto itself.

The idea of democratizing Japan from without, while idealistic, was not an utterly far-fetched proposition. As discussed above, the country had at least modest prior experience with democracy, a fact which seems to have eluded the many contemporary American “experts” on the Japan who were skeptical of the Occupation’s enterprise.²¹ Democracy in the interwar years served as an important historical reference point for domestic Japanese actors, some of whom included the very liberals, socialists, and communists who opposed the ascendance of authoritarianism in the 1930s. Lack of historical insight notwithstanding, however, MacArthur and his circle were confident on the basics of what they thought had to be done to produce enduring democracy: every person who ran or profited from the war was to be purged from public life and the societal interests which had pushed for expansion in the first place were to be eliminated. The Occupation assumed that as long as these actors and interests existed, democracy had little chance of taking hold in the long run.

First and foremost, blame for the war fell on the military, and a series of tribunals were convened as soon as the war ended. These trials were an integral part of the demilitarization of Japanese society. As the Americans saw it, they removed, quite literally, the most egregious offenders from the social equation. When the victor’s justice was said and done, 5,700 so-called Class B/C “war criminals,” a new term at the time, were indicted, of whom roughly 920 were executed and 475 received life sentences.²² Of the top-level Class A criminals sentenced in the
Tokyo trial (widely regarded as a showcase, despite meticulous attention to procedural detail on part of the prosecution), seven were hanged, sixteen imprisoned for life, and five died in prison; however, many more were either paroled, or later granted clemency after the occupation ended. In addition to purging most of the top military and civilian leadership, the Occupation eliminated the basic war material of the armed forces, destroying munitions, planes, tanks, and weapons on a huge scale.

Second on the American reform agenda was the economy. The landlord class, which had been a key constituency aligned with the old regime, was explicitly targeted through an “agrarian land reform” policy and within a few years had been almost entirely disposed of its holdings, creating a huge class of small farmers on its former estates which were presumed be more receptive to democratic governance. In addition, a policy of “deconcentration” was targeted at the family-owned zaibatsu holding companies, which the Americans regarded as war profiteers and a primary interest group opposed to democratization. By the end of the war, the top ten zaibatsu had gained control of almost half the capital in the mining, machinery, shipbuilding and chemical industries; half of the capital in the banking sector; and sixty percent of both the insurance and shipping industries. These industrial-political elites had every reason to be actively opposed to democratization in the aftermath of the war. The political freedoms of speech, and assembly the Occupation put in place immediately granted immense legitimacy and political cover to the conglomerates’ domestic opponents: a unionization movement, radical and moderate socialist parties, and, most threatening, a newly-legal and resurgent Japanese Communist Party. All three had origins dating back to the era of Taisho Democracy and were either actively supported by the American reformers, as was the case with the labor movement, or were at least not initially seen as a threat in the case of the latter two. Over time, however, the tolerance of the Americans for the radicalism of these movements grew thin, a point to be returned to below, and for a variety of other reasons a cozier relationship developed between the occupying forces, the zaibatsu, and the remnants of the conservative political establishment. By the time the Occupation ended, only a handful of the immense number of zaibatsu originally targeted for breakup actually ended up being disintegrated.

Conspicuously absent from the American reform agenda was the Japanese state itself, specifically the bureaucracy. Since the Meiji era the central bureaucracy had played a major role in Japanese life, managing everything from near-universal education, to infrastructure, to
economic planning. By the time of the American occupation, it was an interest group unto itself and could reasonably have been accused of helping to perpetrate the war. The Occupation forces, however, one did not conceptualize the bureaucracy as an actor in society. Working from an American administrative tradition predicated on the ideal of purely technical, command and control systems of management, U.S. personal had no basis in experience for understanding the central role and initiative the bureaucracy had taken in Japan’s earlier development. Rather, they saw it as a tool wielded by other interests, such as the emperor, military, zaibatsu, and now the occupiers. By the time Japan formally regained its sovereignty after the Occupation, the bureaucracy had grown substantially in relative power vis-à-vis other domestic interest groups and was set to regain its guiding role in society.²⁹

The crowning achievement of the Occupation was without a doubt the newly drafted Japanese constitution. Written by MacArthur and a close circle of advisors, it included virtually every democratic safeguard and political freedom ever conceived of in the West. Among many things, the constitution expanded the franchise to include all men and women, established a clearly defined bicameral parliament which appointed the prime minister, and wrote into law a renunciation of Japan’s sovereign right to wage war (the world-unique Article 9). The only vestige of the Meiji constitution of 1889 was the Emperor himself, who was relegated to a ceremonial role in the state. Despite much backroom protest from the highest officials of the nominal Japanese government, the constitution was translated into Japanese virtually verbatim from its original English with only a few minor amendments permitted.³⁰ With the formal adoption of the constitution in 1947, Japan, at least on paper, transitioned to full democracy.

THE OCCUPATION’S “REVERSE COURSE”

An important theoretical lens through which to view the Occupation, both in its initial and later phase, lies in the transitions framework presented by O'Donnell and Schmitter. In their model, one common route to democracy lies through defeat in an international conflict followed by occupation by a country which is itself a political democracy. A factor which enhances the odds of a successful transition is the presence of what they refer to as a “preauthoritarian legacy,” meaning the remnants of old institutions, political parties, civil society groups, and others who can help revive a prior political system. Factors which push against a successful transition to democracy include interest groups willing to launch coups against a new
government, and existence of past “scores to settle” between competing factions. O’Donnell and Schmitter cite other possible countervailing factors, but those shed less light on the Japanese case than the ones mentioned. Critical, however, is their conceptualization of “pact-making” among interest groups jockeying for position during an uncertain transition.

As discussed above, immediately upon the arrival of the occupiers Japan’s preauthoritarian legacy was revived by leftist social and labor movements eager to exercise long repressed political voices and push for representation. With the U.S. pushing a democratization agenda and actively gutting the military complex, there was little to stand in their way. Japan faced a somewhat unique situation in that there was not the slightest chance of an anti-democratic coup taking place on the Americans’ watch, so while the extent to which the country would be forced to democratize was anyone’s guess, it became clear to most actors early on that the political system was opening up. With conservatives in all areas (political, military, economic) in retreat and revived preauthoritarian, pro-democratic groups in the wings, Japan’s democratic consolidation seemed all but certain in the Occupation’s early years.

By 1948, however, the situation was beginning to change. The breakdown of the victorious WWII alliance and the emerging realpolitik between the Soviet Union and the United States began to push aside Wilsonian aspirations for the dawn of a peaceful, democratic era in East Asia. For a number of reasons, the Occupation embarked on a “reverse course,” drastically scaling down the economic “deconcentration” program which was set to break up the zaibatsu en masse and backpedaling on political liberties. First, influential American policymakers, notably Under Secretary of the Army William H. Draper, Jr., began to question the wisdom of tearing down Japan’s industrial economy and war-making capacity in the face of the mounting Soviet threat. The U.S. was not only spending massive quantities of money aiding Japan while simultaneously threatening its core industries with dismemberment, but was suddenly finding itself in need of a strong East Asian bulwark against communism. Second, the outbreak of the Korean war abruptly created enormous demand for Japanese industrial goods, at once infusing cash into the zaibatsu and making them a lynchpin in the American war effort. Finally, on the domestic front, ongoing demonstrations and strikes (reminiscent of Japan’s experience during World War I) by unions and leftists of all stripes, including communist, pressured by the slow pace of the post-war recovery prior to the Korean conflict, began act more militantly and draw the ire of the authorities. A cycle ensued, wherein each new level of radicalism on the left further
alienated the Americans, who then cranked up repression and became more sympathetic to the remaining civilian old guard.34

As the Occupation wore on in these later years, the Americans began to behave increasingly like just another interest group in the country. Yes, ultimate decision making power still rested at the point of their guns, but the desire to extricate themselves from running the country put them in the position of having to cut deals (make pacts) with other actors that would have been inconceivable in 1945. The final arrangements can be characterized succinctly: first, the U.S. traded economic reform for an industrialized, if cartelized, Japan capable of anchoring East Asian security; second, the Occupation authorities quietly allowed the rehabilitation of the old-guard conservative politicians in exchange for the assurance that Japan would not succumb to domestic social movements and drift into the communist bloc. The result was a Japan which democratized only part way, retaining a sound, liberal constitution up to the present, but never developing the kind of robust political competition characterized by frequent turnovers of power. Up until the 1990s, a single conservative party, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) was in government continuously. It would not be an exaggeration to say, then, that perhaps the most enduring Occupation legacy in Japan is that of polyarchy; a small political and economic elite cycling its members through power continuously within the confines of an otherwise thoroughly liberal constitution.

CONCLUSION
Japan’s modern experience with democracy has been defined at all stages by the country’s relationship with external forces. From its initial opening at the point of a gun in the mid-nineteenth century, to its induced “revolution from above” in the Meiji era, Japan was playing catch up to the West. As it modernized and domestic forces began to push for democracy, the old order started to slowly erode, with the Meiji Constitution, and the expansion of political liberties in the interwar years being major milestones. The pressures of war forged the efficient, bureaucratized state still present today, while at the same time producing a backslide into totalitarianism in the 1930s as the democracy’s key permissive condition, peace, was removed. The American Occupation explicitly engaged in a democratization process and was quite successful, but the realities of real politick at the dawn of the Cold War necessitated a return of sovereignty to some of the very actors responsible for the horrors of World War II. Japan today,
while certainly worthy of being called a democracy, possesses a political system characterized by polyarchy and a clear lack of institutionalized political competition.

5 Moore, Jr., *Social Origins*, 248-50.
10 Moore, Jr., *Social Origins*, 258.
13 Ibid., 58.
15 Porter names five, but the main distinctions are captured in the three broader phases listed.
16 Ibid., 213-14.
18 Ibid., 150.
19 Ibid., 154.
20 Ibid., 87.
21 See J. W. Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1999), 217-24. Many influential American “experts” on Japan took as an article of faith the notion that the Japanese were inherently incapable of self-governance. In fact, given that they spent their time exclusively in elite circles of Japanese society, these pessimists were merely restating the biases those elites themselves had towards the masses. The drive for democratization came from other experts who either argued that democratic aspirations were universal or that at the very least the Japanese could be taught democracy.
23 Ibid., 450.
24 Ibid., 78-79.
25 Ibid., 82.
26 Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 530-33. Interestingly, the zaibatsu themselves at first welcomed the occupiers, having come to see the war as a battle for survival against domestic militarism and an overreaching state bureaucracy. Industrial elites assumed the occupiers would be the same “conservative businessmen and clubbish diplomats they had known before the war” and would leave after mild reform of the state and military. When instead the conglomerates were confronted with “New Deal-style reformism and trust busting” they were quite taken aback.
32 Ibid., 37-38.
34 Dower, Embracing Defeat, 271-73.